Antitrust: Preseason Football Tickets and Tie-Ins, Coniglio v. Highwood Services, Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974) by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1975 Issue 2 
January 1975 
Antitrust: Preseason Football Tickets and Tie-Ins, Coniglio v. 
Highwood Services, Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Antitrust: Preseason Football Tickets and Tie-Ins, Coniglio v. Highwood Services, Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d 
Cir. 1974), 1975 WASH. U. L. Q. 495 (1975). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/9 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
ANTITRUST: PRESEASON FOOTBALL TICKETS AND TIE-INS
Coniglio v. Highwood Services, Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974)
Plaintiff, a season ticket holder' of defendant's Buffalo Bills football
team, instituted a class action, alleging that the requirement that pur-
chasers of regular season tickets also buy exhibition game tickets2 con-
stituted an illegal tying arrangement under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.' The federal district court granted defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment.4 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
l. Season ticket holders are entitled to preferential seating in the Buffalo Bills sta-
dium and preferential options in the purchase of tickets for post-season playoff games.
Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1288 (2d Cir. 1974).
2. Season ticket holders had to purchase tickets for one exhibition game in 1966,
two in 1968 and three in 1970. Id.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) states in part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal ....
Plaintiff argued that because exhibition and regular season games were separate pro-
ducts, and because season and individual game tickets were separate products, Highwood
Services, Inc. had created a tie between the season tickets and the exhibition tickets
which was either unreasonable or illegal per se. Brief for Appellant at 5-18, Coniglio
v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974). Plaintiff also alleged that
Highwood Services, Inc., the National Football League, and Pete Rozelle (the League's
president) had conspired to restrain trade in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1970). Brief for Appellant at 26, Coniglio v. Hfighwood Servs., Inc., 495
F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974).
Highwood Services, Inc. contended that: exhibition games and season games were one
product; season game tickets were the same product as the sum of all the individual game
tickets; and even if a tie existed, there was no anticompetitive effect. Brief for Appel-
lees at 12-20, Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974).
4. Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 95,554 (W.D.N.Y.).
The district court judge, in a two-paragraph opinion, reasoned that "[because the buyer
is free to buy either a season ticket or individual game tickets, there is no tying problem
.Id. The argument assumes that the exhibition games are a separate product
from the season games, and that the season game ticket is the sum of the individual
game tickets.
Five other district courts have heard similar suits against National Football League
teams and granted summary judgment for defendants. Rubin v. Miami Dolphins, Ltd.,
Civil No. 74-129 (S.D. Fla., May 22, 1974), cited in Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Foot-
ball Club, Inc., 498 F.2d 321, 322 (5th Cir. 1974); Grossman Dev. Co. v. Detroit Lions,
Inc., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 95,538 (E.D. Mich.), affd, 503 F.2d 1404 (6th Cir. 1974) (un-
published opinion); Laing v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 59
(D. Minn. 1973), affd per curiarm, 492 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
832 (1974); Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. 94,401
(N.D. Tex.), alf'd, 498 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1974); Pfeiffer v. New England Patriots Foot-
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firmed and held: Since the defendant had monopolies over both the
exhibition and regular season game markets, the tying arrangement be-
tween the two separate monopolized products had no anticompetitive
effect and therefore did not violate the Sherman Act.
The Sherman Act, which proscribes "[e]very contract ...in re-
straint of trade," has been construed to prohibit only unreasonable re-
straints of trade)' Nonetheless, certain arrangements are always con-
sidered unreasonable and are thus illegal per se.8 In Northern Pacific
ball Club, Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. 93,265 (D. Mass. 1972), appeal dismissed, Civil No.
72-1306 (1st Cir., Nov. 1, 1972). The federal district courts have held that the tie-in
does not have any anticompetitive effect, Grossman Dev. Co. v. Detroit Lions, Inc., su-
pra; Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., supra, or that individual tickets are
the same as season tickets, or exhibition games and season games are the same, such
that there are not two products to be "tied" together, Laing v. Minnesota Vikings Foot-
ball Club, Inc., supra; Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., supra; Pfeiffer
v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., supra. The latter argument is based on
the definition of a tie-in, see note 10 inIra. Unless the seller offers the tying product
only on the condition that the tied product is also purchased, there is no tie-in. If sea-
son tickets are only the sum of individual game tickets, there is no exclusive tie because
the products may be purchased individually.
5. Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), quoted in part note 3 supra.
7. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). For a detailed history
and analysis of the rule of reason, see Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Con-
cept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (horizontal territorial
restraints); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (boycott);
Fashion Originator's Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (boycott);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (price fixing agreement).
The rationale for the creation of these per se categories is based upon the Court's conclu-
sion that
there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious ef-
fect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively pre-
sumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This
principle of per se unreasonableness . . . avoids the necessity for an incred-
ibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation ....
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); accord, United States v.
Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972).
The creation of the per se categories is the culmination of experience and
analysis wherein it has been ascertained that such conduct will be unreason-
able, that is, that the conduct involves such an anticompetitive purpose and ef-
fect as to outweigh any business justification in the overwhelming proportion
of its occurrences and can therefore be found to be illegal after mere identifi-
cation.
Note, Tie-out-A Case for the Extension of Tying Theory, 35 OHio ST. L.J. 140, 142
(1974); see Wheeler, Some Observations on Tie-ins, the Single Product Defense, Exclu-
sive Dealing and Regulated Industries, 60 CALIF. L. Rav. 1557 (1972); Note, Tying Ar-
rangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 626 (1960).
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Railway v. United States' the Supreme Court held that tying arrange-
ments"0 were illegal per se if the party "has sufficient economic power
9. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
10. [A] tying arrangement may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell
one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different
(or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from
any other supplier.
Id. at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
The earliest and most common type of tie-in arrangements were agreements under
which the owner of a patented article would license another's use of the patent only on
the condition that the licensee also purchase certain unpatented articles from the patent
owner. At first these agreements were found not to be violative of the Sherman Act.
See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912). Later cases held to the con-
trary. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917) (overruling A.B. Dick). Patent tying arrangements were also held to constitute
violations of § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), because they "necessarily
lessen competition." United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 457
(1922). "The very existence of such restriction suggests that in its absence a compet-
ing article of equal or better quality would be offered at the same or at a lower price.'"
Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 32 n.2 (1931),
quoting VAUGHAN, ECONOMICS OF OUR PATENT SYSTEM 125-27.
These allegations of patent misuse and antitrust violation, challenging the validity of
conditions imposed upon the license of a patent, were generally raised as a defense in
patent infringement actions. As a remedy, courts have refused to enforce such condi-
tions. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680
(1944) (combination patent on hot air furnace, tying in fan switch); Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (same); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger
Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (patent on salt depositing machine, tying in salt); Carbice
Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., supra; cf. Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber
Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938) (patent on process for using coal emulsion for road construc-
tion, tying in coal emulsion).
Finally, in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947), the
Court found it "unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial mar-
ket." This statement was reasserted by the Court in United States v. Columbia Steel
Co., 334 U.S. 495, 552 (1948) (dictum): "A restraint may be unreasonable . . . be-
cause it falls within the class of restraints that are illegal per se." The results in these
two cases are based upon the belief that
[t]ying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of com-
petition. . . . In the usual case only the prospect of reducing competition
would persuade a seller to adopt such a contract and only his control of the
supply of the tying device, whether conferred by patent monopoly or otherwise
obtained, could induce a buyer to enter one.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
For a history of tying arrangements, see Abrams, Tying Arrangements and Exclusive
Dealing Contracts, 53 CHi. BAR REcoRD 75 (1971); McCarthy, Trademark Franchising
and Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie-ins, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 1085 (1970); Turner, The
Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. L REv. 50 (1958);
Wolfstone, Antitrust Tying Arrangements: Fortner, FTC and Statutory Remedies for
Automobile Franchise Abuses, 52 OnE. L. REv. 237 (1973); Note, Tie-out-A Case
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with respect to the tying product to restrain appreciably free competi-
tion in the market for the tied product and a 'not insubstantial' amount
of interstate commerce is affected.""
After Northern Pacific, courts recognized a defense to the per se
rule. A defendant may claim that there is but one product involved
and therefore no tie exists. This fact can be proved in several ways:
as a matter of market analysis there is only one product;' 2 as a matter
for the Extension of Tying Theory, supra note 8; 1 LOYOLA U. (of Chicago) L.L 132
(1970).
11. 356 U.S. at 6. The requirements have been modified and explained by subse-
quent cases. Tie-in arrangements may be either unreasonable or illegal per se. Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499-500 (1969). Normally,
the "'not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce" requirement will be satisfied if
the total amount of business foreclosed by the tie is "substantial enough in terms of dol-
lar volume so as not to be merely de minimus." Id. at 501. The sufficient economic
power requirement may be satisfied
whenever the seller can exert some power over some of the buyers in the mar-
ket. ... the proper focus of concern is whether the seller has the power to
raise prices, or impose other burdensome terms such as a tie-in, with respect
to any appreciable number of buyers within the market.
Id. at 503-04. Such power may be inferred from the uniqueness or desirability of the
tying product. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (copyright);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (patent); Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (trade-
mark). To maintain a private antitrust action, it may be necessary to prove that this
economic power was exercised. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broad-
casting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 446 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1063 (1972); Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 365 F. Supp. 888 (D. Conn.
1973); Abercrombie v. Lum's Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Fla. 1972); N.W. Controls,
Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493 (D. Del. 1971).
For a discussion and brief analysis of the "sufficient power" and "not insubstantial
commerce" requirement, see Note, Tie-out-A Case for the Extension of Tying Theory,
supra note 8; Note, Per Se Doctrine-Tying Arrangements and the Market Power Re-
quirement, 8 TuLsA U. 235 (1972).
Tying arrangements may also be found unreasonable per se under § 3 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), but the standards for per se illegality are different. See
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953). Section
3 of the Clayton Act is limited to "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or
other commodities ... ." Advance Bus. Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d
55, 64 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970) (section 3 of the Clayton
Act not applicable when either the tying or tied product is a service).
12. The first case to accept this "single product" defense was Times-Picayune Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613 (1953), which assumed that the items
sold were fungible. As a federal district court noted, however,
this rule is easier to state than to apply because antitrust decisions and litera-
ture contain astonishingly little discussion of the criteria to be applied to distin-
guish between component parts of a single product and a multiplicity of
products.
N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493, 501 (D. Del. 1971).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/9
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of business practice the tie is necessary to protect the good will of the
business; 13 or as a matter of business practice the tie is necessary to
'The tests for determining when two products, rather than one, are involved in an illegal
tie-in have never been conclusively established by the Supreme Court." Note, Product
Separability: A Workable Standard to Identify Tie-in Arrangements Under the Antitrust
Laws, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 160, 163 (1972). It has been held that morning newspaper
advertisements are the same product as evening advertisements, Times-Picayune Publish-
ing Co. v. United States, supra, but that the sponsorship of a television program over
ninety-five desirable stations is a separate product from the sponsorship of the same pro-
gram over another thirty-five undesirable stations, American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 848, 850 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), rev'd on other grounds, 446 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1063 (1972).
That the industry is new and that its goodwill may be at stake have been held to be
legitimate reasons for tying two products together as a single product. United States
v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam,
356 U.S. 567 (1961). This "legitimate reasons" justification for inseparability has been
recognized or employed elsewhere. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d
932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Advance Bus. Sys. & Supply Co. v.
SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); Associated
Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965);
Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 931 (1961); N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493
(D. DeL 1971). Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly accepted the "legiti-
mate reasons" defense, it has indicated that it might accept it. See Fortner Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., supra.
The illogic of adopting a "legitimate reasons" defense to prove a per se violation of
the Sherman Act would seem apparent from the rationale of employing the per se test
in the first instance. See note 8 supra. The defense merely shifts the burden of proof,
under the rule of reason analysis, to the defendant.
Thus it will be seen that the court's decision does not really turn on the ques-
tion of inseparability. In fact, by basing its decisions on 'sound business rea-
sons' the court would seem to presuppose that there are two separate products.
Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753, 762 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 820 (1965). The courts, however, have accepted the defense only in unique factual
circumstances. See, e.g., Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., supra (defend-
ant, who owned a patented glass-lined silo and manufactured unloading equipment for
silo, tied equipment into sale of patented silo because no other commercial unloading
equipment would operate correctly); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., supra
(defendant, who sold community antennas in new industry with new technology and had
the only trained workmen for the technology, tied service contract and replacement parts
into sale of antenna system). See Abrams, supra note 10; Austin, The Tying Arrange-
ment: A Critique and Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 88 (1967); McCarthy,
supra note 10; Wheeler, supra note 8; Wolfstone, supra note 10; Note, Tying Arrange-
ments and the Single Product Issue, 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 861 (1970); Note, Product
Separability: A Workable Standard to Identify Tie-In Arrangements Under the Anti-
trust Laws, supra.
13. See, e.g., Susser v. Carvell Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
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protect a new industry. 4 If the defendant does not place himself
within one of these categories,"5 the arrangement will be held illegal
per se and evidence of its reasonableness will not be admitted.""
Following the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Northern Pacific,
the Second Circuit in Coniglio v. Highwood Services, Inc.17 found that
there were four aspects to a per se illegal tying arrangement:
(1) two separate and distinct products, a tying product and a tied prod-
uct; (2) sufficient economic power in the tying market to coerce
purchase of the tied product; (3) anti-competitive effects in the tied
market; and (4) involvement of a "not insubstantial" amount of inter-
state commerce in the tied market.' 8
The court found that the facts of the case easily satisfied the require-
ments of sufficient economic power"9 and a "not insubstantial" amount
855 (1964). But see Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). The Supreme Court has never accepted the good will de-
fense. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949) (dictum); Inter-
national Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
14. See, e.g., Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F.
Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
15. Although some commentators have treated these defenses as separate allega-
tions, e.g., Austin, supra note 12; McCarthy, supra note 10; others argue that Jerrold
Electronics v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aI'd per curiam, 365
U.S. 561 (1961), stands for the proposition that if the defendant has any "legitimate rea-
sons" for tying items together then those items will be treated as one product, e.g.,
Wheeler, supra note 8; Wolfstone, supra note 10.
16. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
17. 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974).
18. Id. at 1289.
19. The court concluded:
Although the question is indeed a close one, we believe that, despite the rela-
tively large quantity of individual game tickets available here, the district
court's conclusion, that as a matter of law the requisite coercive power was ab-
sent, is erroneous.
Id. at 1290. Although correct, the court's asserted difficulty in reaching that conclusion
is perplexing. The court later stated that Highwood had "a monopoly over the presenta-
tion of regular season professional football games." Id. at 1291. Supreme Court deci-
sions have held that the sufficient economic power requirement may be satisfied by a
monopoly, United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (copyright); International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (patent), or an inherently unique prod-
uct, Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (land). See Fortner Enter-
prises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969). The Coniglio court ap-
pears to have defined sufficient economic power in terms of the market demand for the
product. To define economic power in this manner, however, simply redefines the
phrase in terms of how the power is exercised. If Highwood Services, Inc. had a monop-
oly on the regular season professional football tickets, then presumably it could have
refused to sell any individual game tickets and offered, instead only season tickets includ-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/9
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of interstate commerce, 20 and that the distinction between exhibition
and regular season games was "sufficiently sharp" to present a triable
issue of fact inappropriate for summary judgment. 21  The court rea-
soned, however, that, since the defendant had monopolized exhibition
and season game tickets, the tying arrangement did not foreclose any
competition. Because an anticompetitive effect is a necessary element
of a per se illegal tying arrangement, the Second Circuit affirmed the
summary judgment of the claim.22
The court's opinion created a blanket defense to the per se rule for
the owner of two separate monopolies. The defense presumes that the
coercion of consumers to buy undesired products has no anticompeti-
tive effect.23  The court recognized the general rule that tying one
ing tied-in exhibition game tickets. The fact that a defendant does not exercise its
power is irrelevant for purposes of finding per se illegality. Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, supra at 10-11; International Salt Co. v. United States, supra at 400.
20. 495 F.2d at 1290; accord, International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947) (approximately $500,000 in commerce held sufficient).
21. 495 F.2d at 1291. The absence of any explicit standards in the court's decision
on this question is consistent with prior cases. See, e.g., N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Out-
board Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493 (D. Del. 1971). Presumably, the court based
its decision on the two distinctions alleged by the plaintiff: the unimportance of the
won-lost record of exhibition games, and the experimental aspect of the preseason. De-
fendants alleged no "legitimate reasons" for tying the two items together.
22. 495 F.2d at 1291.
[Just as the Bills has a monopoly over the presentation of regular season pro-
fessional football games. . . so too does it have a monopoly over the presenta-
tion of exhibition professional football games-the tied product. Thus, High-
wood is not using its economic power in the tying (season ticket) market to
"restrain free competition in the market for the tied product ....
Id. (footnote omitted). The nearest competitor in the professional football market is
in Cleveland, Ohio.
23. Many cases have noted that coercion of consumers is one of the evils at which
the Sherman Act is directed. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-
45 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1958), quoting
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953):
By conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase of another, a seller
coerces the abdication of the buyer's independent judgment as to the "tied" pro-
duct's merits and insulates it from the competitive stress of the open market.
In Fortner Enterprises, Inc., v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), the
Court, after noting that even a monopolist could not have complete power over the buyer
because some buyers would refuse to buy the product, stated:
[Diespite the freedom of some or many buyers from the seller's power, other
buyers-whether few or many, whether scattered throughout the market or part
of some group within the market--can be forced to accept the higher price be-
cause of their stronger preferences for the product ....
Id. at 503-04; accord, Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965). In all of these cases, however, both coercion and
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product to another monopolized product is a violation of the Sherman
Act,2 4 but asserted that if the first product was also monopolized the
arrangement was immune from antitrust prosecution.25 Although both
of the requirements for per se illegality established by Northern Pacific
were met,26 the court avoided a finding of illegality by restricting the
coverage of the Sherman Act to instances where actual or potential
competitors had been foreclosed.2 7  This restriction upon the Sherman
Act is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court's long-held belief
that tying arrangements "serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppres-
sion of competition. '28
Furthermore, the court's decision was inconsistent with analogous
cases that hold owners of patents and other government-created
monopolies liable for violations of the per se rule against tying arrange-
ments. 9 Presumably, since the defendants in Coniglio were permitted
foreclosure of competitors were present. Therefore, Coniglio is a case of first impres-
sion: The court asserted, in a case that arguably did not present foreclosure of competi-
tion, that when only the coercion of consumers is present no antitrust violation can be
found. See Note, Tie-out-A Case for the Extension of Tying Theory, supra note 8.
24. 495 F.2d at 1291-92. Generally, any tying arrangement is violative of the Sher-
man Act if the "sufficient economic power" and the "not insubstantial amount of com-
merce" requirements are met. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38
(1962); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
25. 495 F.2d at 1291-92: "Accordingly, the tying arrangement attacked by Coniglio
does not fall within the realm of contracts 'in restraint of trade or commerce' proscribed
by Section 1 of the Sherman Act."
26. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
27. The court's finding could be interpreted as establishing a third requirement for
per se illegality. The language used by the court, however, see notes 22 & 25 supra,
argues to the contrary. In addition, the court concluded, "the propriety of summary
judgment in this case rests on Coniglio's total failure to demonstrate an adverse effect
on competition, actual or potential . . . "' 495 F.2d at 1292-93. Moreover, the sug-
gested interpretation would render the Coniglio decision inconsistent with all of the per
se tie-in cases. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495 (1969); United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594 (1953); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). As the
Court held in Fortner, failure to prove a per se violation is not fatal to a plaintiff's case
and summary judgment is improper. The better interpretation of the Coniglio decision
is that a failure to prove some actual or potential anticompetitive effect will constitute
a failure to show that the contract falls under the purview of the Sherman Act. The
issue of the contract's reasonableness thus becomes irrelevant.
28. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
29. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (copyright); Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (land); United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (copyright); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.
392 (1947) (patent); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944)
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to tie monopolized products together, the owner of two patents could
license his patents in the same manner. Such "package licensing,"
however, constitutes patent misuseY0 The decisions have reasoned
that the tie constitutes an unlawful extension of the patent monopoly"1
since the patent only protects the invention and "not that invention plus
some embellishment . . . which also happens to be patented."32  If
government-created monopolies may not be tied into a single package,
football game monopolies should not be treated differently. 3  The
(patent); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 955 (1972) (trademark); Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753
(6th Cir. 1965) (property rights "comparable to a copyright"); Dehydrating Process Co.
v. A.0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961) (patent); see note 10 supra.
30. See note 10 supra. There are many parallels between patent misuse and Sher-
man Act violations. The early tie-in cases arose under claims of patent misuse. Patent
tie-ins were also the first tie-in cases held to violate the Sherman Act and to constitute
a per se unreasonable contract. Id. But, in Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944), the Court asserted that "the legality of any
attempt to bring unpatented goods within the protection of the patent is measured by
the antitrust laws and not by the patent law . . . ." This statement has caused some
confusion between patent misuse and antitrust violations. Compare Preformed Line
Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 265 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 846
(1964), with Berlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 830 (1964).
Package licensing is prohibited per se only when the seller refuses to sell the product
separately. American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959); accord, McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc.,
343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1966); International Mfg.
Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 988 (1965);
Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Yuma Mfg. Co., 296 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Colo. 1969); Turbo
Mach. Co. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 362 F.2d
5 (3d Cir. 1965); Eversharp, Inc. v. Fisher Pen Co., 204 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Ill. 1961);
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Indus. Corp., 64 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y.
1945), appeal dismissed, 154 F.2d 814 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 859 (1946).
31. The patentee may put forth a single-product defense, see International Mfg. Co.
v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 988 (1965), or
argue that the allegedly tied products are available separately, see McCullough Tool Co.
v. Well Surveys Co., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1966);
Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Yuma Mfg. Co., 296 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Colo. 1969); Eversharp,
Inc. v. Fisher Pen Co., 204 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Ill. 1961).
32. American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Co., 268 F.2d 769, 777 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
33. This argument, based on the patent misuse cases, was rejected in Grossman Dev.
Co. v. Detroit Lions, Inc., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 95,538 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1404
(6th Cir. 1974) (unpublished opinion). "mhese cases are based upon the special ra-
tionale that the rights granted under the patent laws of the United States cannot be en-
larged or extended in any way and any enlargement constituted patent misuse." Id. at
95,540. The district court, however, did not explain why the monopoly power possessed
by football teams should not be similarly restricted. In addition, where the defendant
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only arguable distinction is that the professional sports leagues are
unique enterprises deserving singular treatment under the antitrust
laws. 4 Although some arrangements may be required for the exist-
ence of professional sports leagues, a tie-in between season and exhibi-
tion game tickets is hardly one of those "necessary arrangements" that
would justify distinguishing the patent misuse cases from Coniglio.Y'
In addition, the holding in Coniglio is apparently in conflict with
United States v. Loew's Inc.3 6 In that decision the Supreme Court
held that defendant's "block-booking" practice, by means of which cer-
tain attractive movies were licensed only in a block with other less at-
tractive films, was a per se violation of the antitrust laws. The Court
in Loew's noted that per se illegal tie-ins have two possible anticom-
petitive effects: the coercion of buyers to give up the purchase of sub-
stitutes for the tied products, or the destruction of access to the consum-
ing market for competing suppliers of the tied product. 7 Sufficient
is the owner of two patents, there seems to be little justification for the result other than
a blanket prohibition of such coercion.
34. Authors have suggested that courts have employed a distinct kind of analysis
when professional sports associations have been charged with antitrust violations:
Mhe courts have generally decided the lawfulness of its arrangements
by balancing the alleged economic benefits against the potential evils and have
allowed reasonable restraints, even when they fall into a category usually re-
garded as per se illegal.
Note, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the Anti-
trust Laws, 81 HARv. L. REv. 418, 419 (1967); see Note, Player Control Mechanisms
in Professional Team Sports, 34 U. Prrr. L. REv. 645 (1973). The alleged practices
attacked (e.g., league housekeeping rules, player restraints, and owner restraints) are
peculiar and necessary to competitive sports leagues. Some economic cooperation is nec-
essary to insure athletic competition. For example, restrictions on player mobility in-
sures that the less profitable teams will be able to afford the more talented players and
therefore be able to compete on an equal basis with the more profitable teams. It was
not alleged that the exhibition game tie-in promoted athletic competition nor does it ap-
pear that such an argument could successfully defend this practice.
35. See note 34 supra.
36. 371 U.S. 38 (1962). Loew's had a series of copyrights on a number of movies,
some of high quality (e.g., "Gone with the Wind") and some of low quality (e.g., "Get-
ting Gertie's Garter"). These movies were released to television stations only in large
blocks which included a variety of high- and low-quality movies. To obtain one of
Loew's high-quality movies, stations were forced to pay for a number of other undesira-
ble films.
37. 371 U.S. at 45.
A tie-in contract may have one or both of these undesirable effects when the
seller, by virtue of his position in the market for the tying product, has eco-
nomic leverage sufficient to induce his customers to take the tied product along
with the tying item.
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economic power, the first requirement of a per se illegal tying arrange-
ment followed from the copyright, which gave the defendant a "'mo-
nopolistic' position as to each tying product .... -38 The defendant's
"monopolistic" position over each product did not mean, however, that
there was no anticompetitive effect. The Court reasoned that although
each of the desired films "'was itself a unique product' -3 and not
fungible, the less desirable films, while also distinct, were in competi-
tion with other films and programming material. 40 This competition
was suppressed by the tie-in arrangement.41
38. Id. at 48.
39. Id., quoting United States v. Loew's Inc., 189 F. Supp. 373, 381 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
40. 371 U.S. at 49. The Court did not explain how to distinguish desirable and
undesirable films or films that are in competition with other programing materials and
films that are not. The Court simply noted that "the distinctiveness of the copyrighted
tied product is not inconsistent with the fact of competition, in the form of other pro-
graming material and other films, which is suppressed by the tying arrangements." Id.
41. Id. The most significant aspect of Coniglio was the recognition that similar but
separate "monopolized" products have different relevant markets based upon their de-
sirability. The defendant's monopoly of regular season professional football games in
the Buffalo area may have been a monopoly over such a unique and distinct product
that he had no competition. This does not mean, however, that the defendant's exhibi-
tion games monopoly did not experience competition with other kinds of athletic enter-
tainment as a result of a high degree of cross elasticity of demand.
Plaintiff argued that exhibition games were in competition with other types of gen-
eral entertainment in the Buffalo area. The court rejected the argument as
nothing more than the boundless contention that, by extracting extra dollars
from season ticket holders, the Bills leave less in their pockets to spend on
any other form of diversion . . . . Suffice to say that the extraordinary
breadth of the market encompassing such diverse yet assertedly competitive
products is far beyond that ever contemplated for a relevant product market.
495 F.2d at 1292 (emphasis original). The court seems to have suggested that an anti-
competitive effect must encompass more than the mere extraction of dollars. The ex-
traction of dollars, however, has been the major consequence of admittedly anticompeti-
tive tie-ins. In Loew's, when Loew's Inc., forced television stations to purchase extra
movies, it had done little more than extract extra dollars for the purchase of the higher
quality movies to which the lesser quality films were tied. The contract did not prohibit
television stations from purchasing other movies. Such extraction has always been held
to constitute the kind of activity against which the Sherman Act was directed. The con-
sumer, having been forced to purchase an item he did not want, is not thereafter going
to purchase a substitute for the unwanted product. By coercing consumers to purchase
the unwanted tied product, the competitors in that market are foreclosed.
For other package copyright cases see United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 314
U.S. 131 (1948); Pape Television Co. v. Associated Artists Prod. Corp., 277 F.2d 750
(5th Cir. 1960); Field's Prod., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), af!'d per curiam, 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949
(1971); accord, Seago v. N.C. Theatres, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 627 (E.D.N.C. 1966), afr'd per
curtain, 388 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 959 (1968).
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Even if one accepts the Coniglio court's assertion that the mere coer-
cion of a consumer to buy an item that he does not desire is an insuf-
ficient ground for finding a monopoly tie-in illegal, 2 Loew's suggests
that the Coniglio tying arrangement foreclosed competitors of the exhi-
bition football games. 43 Desirable season game tickets, like desirable
movies, may be sufficiently distinctive to warrant a label of monopoly.
But this determination does not mean that exhibition game tickets, or
undesirable movies, also constitute a monopoly and therefore have no
competitors. Under the Loew's analysis, since the exhibition games
have a lower consumer appeal than season games, the former are in
competition with the sale of other products.44 Consequently, a rele-
vant market broader than "exhibition games" would have been appro-
priate.45
The Second Circuit was the first circuit court of appeals to render
a full opinion on the exhibition game tying issue. 46 At the heart of
the court's reasoning lies the assumption that coercing consumers into
purchasing products they do not want is not violative of the Sherman
Act. Sound antitrust policy and the increasing recognition of consum-
ers' rights provide a firm basis for restricting the application of the
Coniglio decision.
42. 495 F.2d at 1293.
43. The Coniglio court did not preclude consideration of a smaller relevant market
that might have brought the tie-in within the range of the prohibition of the Sherman
Act. See 495 F.2d at 1292. For example, a relevant market restricted to athletic enter-
tainment might have been accepted by the court. It would, however, be inconsistent for
courts, while employing the test of per se illegality, to become engrossed in extended
market analysis to determine how to define the relevant market.
44. Brief for Appellants at 7, Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d
Cir. 1974).
45. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
46. The Fifth Circuit, in Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 498 F.2d
321 (5th Cir. 1974), and the Eighth Circuit, in Laing v. Minnesota Vikings Football
Club, Inc., 492 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1974), delivered only per curiam opinions. The
Sixth Circuit's decision in Grossman Dev. Co. v. Detroit Lions, Inc., was rendered in
an unpublished opinion, 503 F.2d 1404 (6th Cir. 1974).
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